Absurd Angst and Metaethical Pain: The Externalist Moral Paradigm and its Production of Angst Over the Normative Force of Ultimate Reasons

Dissertation, Oklahoma State University (2020)
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Abstract

The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative, non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time here to understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several nontrivial beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately, I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts which lead them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons (reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents), or that normative reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or explanations for the normative force and authority of reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents) (these possibilities are not exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because external sources of normativity are theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, make moral claims problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to follow from a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act.

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Pierce Alexander Marks
Southern New Hampshire University

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References found in this work

The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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