Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17 (forthcoming)
Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one is asserting is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm “Assert that p only if you believe that p”. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.
Keywords self-knowledge  assertion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1519771
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Transparency, Belief, Intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowledge and Assertion in “Gettier” Cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Dubious Assertions.David Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
The Logic of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Julian J. Schlöder - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):49-57.
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):813-821.
Representing Yourself as Knowing.Christopher McCammon - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):133-144.
Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):229-237.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-08-29

Total views
108 ( #62,019 of 2,313,606 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #7,780 of 2,313,606 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature