Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889 (2019)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.
Keywords self-knowledge  assertion
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1519771
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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