Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277 (1999)

Authors
Ned Markosian
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation is an incompatibilist theory. That is, both believers and nonbelievers in the theory have taken it for granted that the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is one according to which freedom and determinism are incompatible. In fact, so entrenched is this assumption that no one on either side of the debate has ever questioned it. Yet it turns out that this assumption is wrong – the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is a compatibilist one.
Keywords Agent  Causation  Compatibilism  Epistemology  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00083
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References found in this work BETA

The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
A Plea for Excuses.J. L. Austin - 1964 - In V. C. Chappell (ed.), Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method. Dover Publications. pp. 1--30.
Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will. Blackwell.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

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