An Epistemological Theory of Argumentation for Adversarial Legal Proceedings

Informal Logic 36 (3):288-308 (2016)
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The rhetorical view suggests that the goal of factual ar- gumentation in legal proceedings is to persuade the fact-finder about the facts under litigation. However, R does not capture our social expecta- tions: we want fact-finders to know the facts justifying their decisions, and persuasion does not necessarily lead to knowledge. I want to present an epistemic theory of argumenta- tion honoring our expectations. Un- der my account, factual argumenta- tion aims to transmit knowledge to the fact-finder.



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Danny Marrero
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

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