Belief and Introspective Knowledge in Treatise 1.3.7

Hume Studies 37 (1):99-122 (2011)
Abstract
In Treatise 1.3.7 Hume offers two distinct arguments for the view that the difference between believing a matter of fact and simply conceiving of it consists in a difference in the manner of conception.1 For convenience, I will call the two arguments in Treatise 1.3.7 the “No-new-idea Argument” and the “Argument from Disagreement.” Both arguments have an eliminative structure: Hume argues against other possible accounts of belief and concludes that the only hypothesis left standing is the view that the difference between believing and conceiving is a difference in the manner of conception. He goes on to argue that since belief is a manner of conception, this manner of conception must be a function of the force and ..
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0645
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