Can 'intrinsic' be defined using only broadly logical notions?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672 (2009)
Abstract
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
DOI
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x
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Citations of this work
Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.Dan Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
Intrinsic properties and relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.
On a sufficient condition for hyperintensionality.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):336-354.
References found in this work
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.