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Can 'intrinsic' be defined using only broadly logical notions?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672 (2009)
Abstract
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Essence and Intrinsicality.David Denby - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti, Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 87-109.
Intrinsic properties and relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.
Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.Dan Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?Alexander Skiles - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.
References found in this work
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver, Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
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