Confidence in unwarranted knowledge

Erkenntnis 65 (2):143 - 164 (2006)
Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan’s objection fails for equivocation but that some specific forms of minimalism are better able than others to articulate that defense.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-9007-0
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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