Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):461-462 (2007)

Byrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X07002671
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Reality Monitoring.Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye - 1981 - Psychological Review 88 (1):67-85.
Did I Do It or Did I Only Imagine Doing It?Rita E. Anderson - 1984 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113 (4):594-613.

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