Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142 (2014)

Authors
Teresa Marques
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be accommodated by theoretical positions that allow for the compatibility (at the same world) of the content of different doxastic attitudes.
Keywords Disagreement  Contextualism  Non-indexical contextualism  Relativism  Exclusion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9448-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,992
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Disagreeing in Context.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-12.
An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics.Carl Baker & Jon Robson - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):429-448.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.James Dreier - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-02-27

Total views
211 ( #46,660 of 2,439,425 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #64,990 of 2,439,425 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes