Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions
Dialectica 62 (1):43-57 (2008)
Abstract
According to Donnellan the characteristic mark of a referential use of a definite description is the fact that it can be used to pick out an individual that does not satisfy the attributes in the description. Friends and foes of the referential/attributive distinction have equally dismissed that point as obviously wrong or as a sign that Donnellan's distinction lacks semantic import. I will argue that, on a strict semantic conception of what it is for an expression to be a genuine referential device, Donnellan is right: if a use of a definite description is referential, it must be possible for it to refer to an object independently of any attributes associated with the description, including those that constitute its conventional meaning.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/dltc.2008.62.issue-1
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Citations of this work
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
Donnellan's Misdescriptions and Loose Talk.Carlo Penco - 2017 - In Kepa Korta Maria De Ponte (ed.), Reference and Representation in Language and Thought. Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press. pp. 104-125.
Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 73--99.
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