International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3):257 - 262 (1984)
AbstractSchlesinger's argument for the confirmation of Theism over Naturalism fails. Principle E on which it is based is unacceptable. But even if Principle E were acceptable the argument would not succeed, for other evidence, not considered by Schlesinger, pulls in the other direction cancelling out the confirmatory effect of the evidence he does cite. Further, granted Principle E, it is not clear that theism as it is usually understood makes the evidence he cites more probable than naturalism; consequently he is not justified in concluding that the evidence he cites confirms theism more than naturalism. Finally, Schlesinger fails to take into account the possibility that the initial credibility of theism may be less than naturalism since theism may be incoherent and naturalism may not be; he also fails to take into account the total available evidence relevant to the confirmation of theism and naturalism
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