Emergence and reduction: Reply to Kim

Synthese 151 (3):561-569 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists
Keywords Emergence  Explanation  Physicalism  Properties  Reduction  Science  Kim, Jaegwon
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9026-z
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References found in this work BETA
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):151 - 176.
Approaches to Reduction.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):137-147.
Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept.Jaegwon Kim - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.

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Citations of this work BETA
Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics.David Yates - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
On the Role of Bridge Laws in Intertheoretic Relations.Sorin Bangu - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1108-1119.

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Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction?Max Kistler - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.
Emergence, Supervenience, and Realization.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51.

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