Epistemic Groundings of Abstraction and Their Cognitive Dimension

Philosophy of Science 78 (3):490-511 (2011)
Abstract
In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes of specific abstractions. This suggests that we should understand abstraction as embodied in different kinds of abstraction practices.
Keywords Hans Radder  Nancy Cartwright  Nancy Nersessian  Lawrence Barsalou
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DOI 10.1086/660305
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References found in this work BETA
Chris Pincock (2007). Mathematical Idealization. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):957-967.
Christopher Pincock (2007). Mathematical Idealization. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):957-967.
Nancy J. Nersessian (2005). Abstraction Via Generic Modeling in Concept Formation in Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):117-144.

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