Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):79-108 (2011)

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Abstract
“Is the Kantian Universalization Demand a Suficient Procedure forthe Establishment of Moral-Ethical Contents? Some Considerations Regardinga Negative Answer to this Question”. In this article we analyze the thesis thatclaims the suficiency of the Kantian universalization procedure expressed inthe categorical imperative of the general law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals) to determine the content of morality, with the aim of holding that thisthesis contradicts Kant’s inal conception of Ethics as it is expounded in Metaphysicsof Morals, insofar as it is structured upon the normative priority of the“end of humanity”. The effective adoption of this end –or practical principle– isa necessary condition for the ascription of morality and for the determination ofthe “content” of the “moral law”. In order to achieve this aim, we analyze two ofthe most inluential interpretations that are at the base of the aforementionedthesis, v.gr., John R. Silber’s, in “Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, andHenry E. Allison’s in “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”
Keywords Kant  Kant, universalizabilidad  humanidad como fin  universalizability  morality  humanity as an end  moralidad
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