Events, Sortals, and the Mind–Body Problem

Synthese 150 (1):99-129 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,273

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251-262.
Mental causation as multiple causation.Thomas Kroedel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
The Metaphysics of Emergence.Hong Yu Wong - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):658 - 678.
A problem with anomalous monism.Bruce Goldberg - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.
Mind-body causation and explanatory practice.Tyler Burge - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.


Added to PP

200 (#81,827)

6 months
6 (#160,175)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Marcus
Auburn University

Citations of this work

Mental causation in a physical world.Eric Marcus - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Why and how not to be a sortalist about thought.Rachel Goodman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):77-112.
Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - forthcoming - In Michael Brent (ed.), Mental Action.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

View all 70 references / Add more references