Minds and Machines 8 (3):353-374 (1998)

Authors
Fernando Monge Martínez
National Distance Education University
Abstract
Explicitness has usually been approached from two points of view, labelled by Kirsh the structural and the process view, that hold opposite assumptions to determine when information is explicit. In this paper, we offer an intermediate view that retains intuitions from both of them. We establish three conditions for explicit information that preserve a structural requirement, and a notion of explicitness as a continuous dimension. A problem with the former accounts was their disconnection with psychological work on the issue. We review studies by Karmiloff-Smith, and Shanks and St. John to show that the proposed conditions have psychological grounds. Finally, we examine the problem of explicit rules in connectionist systems in the light of our framework.
Keywords Computer Science   Philosophy of Mind   Artificial Intelligence   Systems Theory, Control   Interdisciplinary Studies
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Reprint years 2004
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DOI 10.1023/A:1008275132559
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References found in this work BETA

Relevance.D. Sperber & D. Wilson - 1995 - Blackwell.
Characteristics of Dissociable Human Learning Systems.David R. Shanks & Mark F. St John - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):367-395.

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Citations of this work BETA

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