London and New York: Routledge (2018)

Authors
Giancarlo Marchetti
Università Degli Studi Di Perugia
Abstract
This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. _Facts and Values_ will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics and law.
Keywords Metaethics
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Reprint years 2016, 2018
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ISBN(s) 9781138955516   1138615412   1138955515
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The Content-Dependence of Imaginative Resistance.Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer & Michael T. Stuart - 2018 - In Florian Cova & Sébastien Réhault (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 143-166.
Resemblance, Exemplification, and Ontology.Paolo Valore - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):131-140.
Kant’s Universalism Versus Pragmatism.Hemmo Laiho - 2019 - In Krzysztof Skowroński & Sami Pihlström (eds.), Pragmatist Kant—Pragmatism, Kant, and Kantianism in the Twenty-first Century. Helsinki, Finland: pp. 60-75.

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