Humean laws and explanation

Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3145-3165 (2015)
Abstract
A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should regard as laws. I will then conclude by rebutting a variant of this objection that appeals to a principle of metaphysical explanation recently put forward by Kit Fine
Keywords Humeanism  Laws  Explanation  Grounding  Kit Fine  David Lewis
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0462-9
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Metaphysics Within Physics.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2009 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109--36.

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Citations of this work BETA

Laws and Their Instances.Nina Emery - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity.Shumener Erica - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx020.
Grounding and the Explanatory Role of Generalizations.Stefan Roski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1985-2003.

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