Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):304-322 (2020)

Authors
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress.
Keywords Inference  Understanding  Carroll's Regress  Taking Condition  Intuition
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12153
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References found in this work BETA

Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.
Self-Knowledge and the Paradox of Belief Revision.Giovanni Merlo - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
The Guise of Good Reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.

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