Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293 (1990)
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Abstract |
I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.
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Keywords | intuitionism moral epistemology conservatism |
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Reprint years | 1990 |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9973.1990.tb00530.x |
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Moral Knowledge Without Justification? A Critical Discussion of Intuitionist Moral Epistemology.Philipp Schwind - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Miami
Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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