Intuitionism and conservatism

Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293 (1954)
Abstract
I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.
Keywords intuitionism  moral epistemology  conservatism
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Reprint years 1990
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.1990.tb00530.x
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Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.

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