Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339 (2006)
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Abstract

There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it

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Eric Marcus
Auburn University

Citations of this work

Attention and intentionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
Why zombies are inconceivable.Eric Marcus - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.

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