Illocutionary force and attitude mode in normative disputes

Metaphilosophy (3-4):1-17 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I assess recent Stalnakerian views of communication in moral and normative domains. These views model context updates with normative claims. They also aim to explain how people disagree when they follow different norms or values. I present four problems for these Stalnakerian views. I conclude that the problems require a new conception of how common ground relates to illocutionary force and attitude mode, which is still lacking.

Similar books and articles

Utterances without Force.Richard Moore - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (3):342-358.
Slurs as Illocutionary Force Indicators.Chang Liu - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1051-1065.
Normativity and Judgement.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17 - 61.
The illocutionary force of laws.Nicholas Allott & Benjamin Shaer - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):351-369.
A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem.Derek Shiller - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740.
Normativity and judgement: Julia Tanney.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):45–61.
Normativity and Judgement.David Papineau & Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73:17-61.
Why the Facts Matter to Public Justification.Philip Shadd - 2015 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 27 (2):198-212.
Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law.Teresa Marques - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Illocutionary rules.Robert M. Harnish & Christian Plunze - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (1):37-52.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-01-11

Downloads
130 (#137,233)

6 months
26 (#109,390)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Teresa Marques
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
The concept of law.Hla Hart - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne.

View all 26 references / Add more references