Neri Marsili
Universitat de Barcelona
In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss' proposed 'worse-off requirement' meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the 'comparative insincerity condition' (Marsili 2014) can meet both. The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a sincerity norm.
Keywords Lying  Norms  Credences  Moral Concepts  Definitions  Insincerity  Deception  Degrees of Belief
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Reprint years 2022
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667865
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References found in this work BETA

The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Philosophy 6 (22):236-240.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (2):179-181.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.
Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.

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