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Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on Gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
Manuscrito 43 (4):49-58 (2020)
Abstract
In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Do conflicting intentions give rise to multiple demonstrative reference? Reply to Mena.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (4):189-198.
Ordinary kinds and ontological angst. Reply to Demartini.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (4):215-220.
Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to Valente.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (4):130-141.
References found in this work
Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Supplementives, the coordination account, and conflicting intentions.Jeffrey C. King - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):288-311.
The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives.Jeff Speaks - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):301-339.
A puzzle about demonstratives and semantic competence.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):709-734.
Referential Mechanics: Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics.Joseph Almog - 2014 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
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