Roberto De Andrade Martins
Universidade de São Paulo
In the early 20th century, science was supposed to be “value free”. In 1953 Richard Rudner claimed that “the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments”, and later philosophers discussed the relations between science and values. From the 60’s onward Michael Scriven and other authors came to the conclusion that non-moral values (intrinsic or epistemic values) are required to evaluate scientific works. This paper supports this general view. However, it stresses that there are several independent scientific values, corresponding to a multi-dimensional value space, and for this reason it is commonly impossible to compare the scientific worth of two different scientific contributions. Scientific values can be used to guide and to evaluate scientific research. However, the result is not a linear succession of better and better theories, but a proliferation of different theories and hypotheses, each of them fulfilling only a few desiderata. RESUMEN: A principios del siglo XX se suponía que la ciencia era “libre de valores”. En 1953 Richard Rudner concedió que “el científico cómo científico hace juicios de valor”, y filósofos posteriores discutieron las relaciones entre la ciencia y los valores. De los años 60 hacia delante, Michael Scriven y otros autores llegaron a la conclusión que valores no-morales (valores científicos intrínsecos o epistémicos) son requeridos para evaluar trabajos científicos. El presente trabajo utiliza esta perspectiva general. Sin embargo, enfatiza que hay muchos valores científicos independientes, correspondiendo a un espacio multidimensional de valores, y por esta razón es comúnmente imposible comparar los valores científicos de dos contribuciones científicas diversas. Los valores científicos se pueden utilizar para dirigir y para evaluar la investigación científica. Sin embargo, el resultado no es una sucesión linear de teorías mejores y mejores, sino una proliferación de teorías y hipótesis diversas, y cada una de ellas satisfaz solamente algunos desiderata.
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