Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects
Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545 (2013)
Abstract
The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their featuresAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/1467-9213.12060
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Citations of this work
The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
Reality in-itself and the Ground of Causality.Christian Onof - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):197-222.
Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism.Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):77-101.
Kant and the concept of an object.Nicholas F. Stang - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):299-322.
References found in this work
P.Immanuel Kant - 1969 - In Allgemeiner Kantindex Zu Kants Gesammelten Schriften. Band. 20. Abt. 3: Personenindex Zu Kants Gesammelten Schriften. De Gruyter. pp. 96-103.
Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2007 - In Jürgen Stolzenberg (ed.), Kant in der Gegenwart. De Gruyter. pp. 167-212.