Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545 (2013)

Authors
Colin Marshall
University of Washington
Abstract
The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features
Keywords Kant  qua-objects  transcendental idealism  appearances  things in themselves
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.12060
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reality in-Itself and the Ground of Causality.Christian Onof - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):197-222.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Causality and Things in Themselves.Kent Baldner - 1988 - Synthese 77 (3):353 - 373.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti‐Realism.Lucy Allais - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):369 – 392.
Transcendental Idealism in the 'Aesthetic'.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):63–88.
Thing and Object.Kristie Miller - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
Who’s Afraid of Double Affection?Nicholas Stang - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW]Lara Denis - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?William D. Blattner - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):185 – 201.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-05-13

Total views
1,258 ( #2,339 of 2,325,383 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
224 ( #1,763 of 2,325,383 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes