Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545 (2013)
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The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features

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Colin Marshall
University of Washington