Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism

Kantian Review 24 (1):77-101 (2019)
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Abstract

Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain.

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Colin Marshall
University of Washington

Citations of this work

Kant-Bibliographie 2019.Margit Ruffing - 2021 - Kant Studien 112 (4):623-660.
Kant's Proof of the Existence of the Outer World.Bianca Ancillotti - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25 (1):163–189.

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References found in this work

Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Wolfgang Schwarz - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):449-451.
Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and His Realism.Lucy Allais - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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