European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have deep roots in Kant's philosophy. My second aim is to present three potential solutions to the puzzle and show that each faces problems.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception.Colin Marshall - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4).
Judgments of Perception and the Transcendental Deduction.James Michael Barker - 1998 - Dissertation, The Florida State University
The Epistemic Role of Kantian Intuitions.Ian Eagleson - 1999 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
Kant on the Content of Cognition.Tolley Clinton - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):200-228.
Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
Os Juízos de Gosto sobre a Arte na Terceira “Crítica”: Série 2 / Judgments of Taste Regarding Art in the Third Critique.Zeljko Loparic - 2010 - Kant E-Prints 5:119-141.
Getting Acquainted with Kant.Colin McLear - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 171-97.
Why Kant Is a Non-Conceptualist But Is Better Regarded a Conceptualist.Corijn van Mazijk - 2014 - Kant Studies Online:170-201.
Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2017-03-28
Total downloads6 ( #563,605 of 2,178,142 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #45,124 of 2,178,142 )
How can I increase my downloads?