History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):151-170 (1980)

Abstract
This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein on logic and mathematics
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DOI 10.1080/01445348008837008
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Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle.Cesare Cozzo - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
Transandantal metafiziğin olanaği: Kant ve Wıttgensteın.Cengiz İskender Özkan - 2016 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (1).

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