Erkenntnis:1-12 (forthcoming)
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Abstract |
In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.
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Keywords | Assertion Performative Utterances Speech Act Theory Testimony Deception Lying Insincerity Definition of Lying What is said Commitment Conversational scorekeeping |
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DOI | 10.1007/s10670-020-00368-4 |
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References found in this work BETA
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1979 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Assertion: A (Partly) Social Speech Act.Neri Marsili & Mitchell Green - 2021 - Journal of Pragmatics 181 (August 2021):17-28.
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95 ( #7,557 of 2,498,579 )
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