Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474 (2011)
The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to Megarian logical fatalism and its purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning is needed.
|Keywords||logical determinism fatalism Megarian|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
On a Theological Argument for Fatalism.Susan Haack - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.
Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps.Nicola Ciprotti - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
Some Sketchy Notes on the Reaper Argument.Vladimir Marko - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (3):361-387.
Logical Determinateness, Fixity, and the Symmetry of Time.Joseph Diekemper - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (1):1-24.
Logical Form.Christopher Menzel - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
Facets of Megarian Fatalism: Aristotelian Criticisms and the Stoic Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.Michael J. White - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):189 - 206.
Added to index2011-11-13
Total downloads253 ( #12,277 of 2,143,791 )
Recent downloads (6 months)42 ( #5,893 of 2,143,791 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.