Lying: Knowledge or belief?

Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460 (2021)
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Abstract

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

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Neri Marsili
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.
The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.
True lies and attempted lies.Emanuel Viebahn - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

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