Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269 (2020)

Authors
Neri Marsili
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying.
Keywords Definition of Lying  Insincerity  Deception  Performative Utterances  Commitment  Assertion  Communication  Responsibility  Belief expression  Common Ground
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02933-4
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References found in this work BETA

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Assertion: A (Partly) Social Speech Act.Neri Marsili & Mitchell Green - 2021 - Journal of Pragmatics 181 (August 2021):17-28.
Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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