Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50 (2005)

Eric Marcus
Auburn University
<b> </b>Abstract: It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but hold that Completeness, together with certain plausible assumptions, _entails_ Closure. I refute the most fully worked-out version of such an argument. Finally, some find Completeness all by itself threatening to mental causation. I argue that one will only find Completeness threatening if one operates with a philosophically distorted conception of mental causation. I thereby defend what I call naïve realism about mental causation
Keywords Closure  Mental Causation  Metaphysics  Physical
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2204-x
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An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.

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Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation as Multiple Causation.Thomas Kroedel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.

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