Mental causation in a physical world

Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50 (2005)
Abstract: It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but hold that Completeness, together with certain plausible assumptions, _entails_ Closure. I refute the most fully worked-out version of such an argument. Finally, some find Completeness all by itself threatening to mental causation. I argue that one will only find Completeness threatening if one operates with a philosophically distorted conception of mental causation. I thereby defend what I call naïve realism about mental causation
Keywords Closure  Mental Causation  Metaphysics  Physical
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2204-x
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References found in this work BETA
Supervenience and Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mental Causation as Multiple Causation.Thomas Kroedel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
Immense Multiple Realization.Anders Strand - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (1):61-78.

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