Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia

Dialogue 32 (3):475-92 (1993)
Abstract
Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.)
Keywords Functionalism  Materialism  Metaphysics  Qualia  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300012270
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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