Monty Hall Saves Dr. Evil: On Elga’s Restricted Principle of Indifference

Erkenntnis 85 (1):65-76 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper I show that Elga’s argument for a restricted principle of indifference for self-locating belief relies on the kind of mistaken reasoning that recommends the ‘staying’ strategy in the Monty Hall problem.

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