Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):274-291 (2009)

Authors
Patricia Marino
University of Waterloo
Abstract
It is sometimes argued that having inconsistent desires is irrational or otherwise bad for an agent. If so, if agents seem to want a and not-a, then either their attitudes are being misdescribed – what they really want is some aspect x of a and some aspect y of not-a – or those desires are somehow 'inconsistent' and thus inappropriate. I argue first that the proper characterization of inconsistency here does not involve logical form, that is, whether the desires involved have the form 'a and not-a', but rather the possibility of fulfilling all one's desires; and secondly, that the 'essential' conflicts involved in such inconsistencies are quite common and no worse for an agent than contingent conflicts. I draw implications concerning moral epistemology, moral realism and the logic of attitudes.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.570.x
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References found in this work BETA

Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.
Standing for Something.Cheshire Calhoun - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (5):235-260.
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Attitudes and Contents.Simon Blackburn - 1988 - Ethics 98 (3):501-517.

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Citations of this work BETA

Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Ambivalence and Alienation.Logi Gunnarsson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):13-26.
Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.
The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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