On the mind dependence of truth

Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318 (2006)
Abstract
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-0002-2
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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Consequences of Pragmatism.Richard Rorty - 1982 - University of Minnesota Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Concepts and Stereotypes.Georges Rey - 1983 - Cognition 15 (1-3):237-62.

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