On the mind dependence of truth

Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318 (2006)

Authors
Diego Marconi
Università degli Studi di Torino
Abstract
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-0002-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 41,507
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Consequences of Pragmatism.Richard Rorty - 1982 - University of Minnesota Press.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truth as One and Many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Clarendon Press.
Truth and Exemplarism.John Peterson - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):69-77.
Meaning's Role in Truth.Charles Travis - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):451-466.
God As Truth.John Peterson - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (3):342-360.
Prior’s Theory of Truth.Charles Sayward - 1987 - Analysis 47 (2):83-87.
Necessity and Triviality.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning.L. A. Zadeh - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):407-428.
Truth.Bradley Dowden - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
76 ( #102,234 of 2,248,762 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #605,972 of 2,248,762 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature