On using intentionality in empirical phenomenology: The problem of 'mental images'

Dialectica 38 (2‐3):209-230 (1984)
The theory of so-called‘mental images’, which is put forward again in contemporary cognitive psychology, is criticized by way of elaborating the distinctly different intentional structures of the mental activities of‘remembering something’and‘representing something pictorially’(by means of a painting, photo, sculpture, etc.) It is suggested that psychology in its concept and theory formation could use profitably phenomenological-descriptive analyses of the different forms of intentionality as exemplified in the paper.
Keywords Intentionality  Mental Image  Metaphysics  Phenomenology  Husserl  Kosslyn, S
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01245.x
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References found in this work BETA
Zenon Pylyshyn (2004). Imagery. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.

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