Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union?

Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):255-280 (2014)
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Abstract

Philosophers have accused locke of holding a view about propositions that simply conflates the formation of a propositional thought with the judgment that a proposition is true, and charged that this has obviously absurd consequences.1 Worse, this account appears not to be unique to Locke: it bears a striking resemblance to one found in both the Port-Royal Logic (the Logic, for short) and the Port-Royal Grammar. In the Logic, this account forms part of the backbone of the traditional logic expounded in the text. As a result, the account’s alleged faults seem to seriously threaten the coherence and value of the whole approach to logic. And to the extent that Locke’s core philosophical commitments, in particular his ..

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Citations of this work

Locke, Arnauld, and Abstract Ideas.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):75-94.
Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas.Shelley Weinberg - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):347-370.
Arnauld's Verbal Distinction Between Ideas and Perceptions.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2016 - History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (4):375-390.
How Berkeley's Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):553-576.

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