Pains as reasons

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
Authors
Manolo Martínez
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states
Keywords Pain  Reasons  Imperativism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0408-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - forthcoming - Noûs 2017.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives.Colin Klein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):554-557.
When Pains Are Mental Objects.Abraham Olivier - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53.
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Pains and Sounds.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):143-163.
More in Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
Reconsidering Pain.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.
Pain and Value.Adam Swenson - 2006 - Dissertation, Rutgers University, New Brunswick
Mad Pain and Martian Pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-22

Total downloads
105 ( #60,709 of 2,294,106 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #6,980 of 2,294,106 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature