Abstract

This article views the confrontation between pragmatism and Kant’s Critical undertaking as very possibly the single most consequential agon of contemporary philosophy, given the utter irreconcilability of their respective ways of addressing the concerns of First Philosophy, with regard to the enabling conditions of cognitive realism. Pragmatism favors an informal, fluxive, “instrumentalist” form of empiricism, impossible to complete, opposed to any and all the ontic and epistemic fixities of Kant’s Rationalism. Reason (Vernunft) cannot be more than a fiction. Kant has no supporting criterion of realism. The article proposes an empirical criterion of the distinctive (given) “duality” of sensory “appearings” and “appeareds” (that is, objects) as yielding a plausible “cognitive faculty” (involving “reasoning”—inference, for instance—but not Vernunft) that, in accord with the drift of evolutionism and Aristotle, readily extends to languageless animals as well as humans. It serves as the linchpin of the paper.