Religious Studies 19 (1):57 - 64 (1983)

Can Pascal's wager for the existence of God be turned against the religious believer and used as an argument for not believing in God? Although such an argument has been very briefly sketched by others its details have remained undeveloped. In this paper this argument is worked out in detail in the context of decision theory and is defended against objections. The result is a plausible argument for atheism
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412500014700
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The Persecutor's Wager.Craig Duncan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):1-50.
After Pascal’s Wager: On Religious Belief, Regulated and Rationally Held.Jack Warman & David Efird - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):61-78.

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