Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility

Abstract
Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work.
Keywords Happiness  Benatar  Procreation  Positive Psychology  Anti-natalism  Optimism
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12114
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
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Which Problem of Adaptation?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (4):474-492.

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