Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466 (2014)
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Abstract |
Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work.
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Keywords | Happiness Benatar Procreation Positive Psychology Anti-natalism Optimism |
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DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12114 |
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References found in this work BETA
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
View all 53 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where It Leads.Jason Marsh - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207.
Dismantling the Asymmetry Argument.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (1):75-90.
What’s Wrong with “You Say You’Re Happy, but…” Reasoning?Jason Marsh - 2020 - In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
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