Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility


Authors
Jason Marsh
St. Olaf College
Abstract
Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work.
Keywords Happiness  Benatar  Procreation  Positive Psychology  Anti-natalism  Optimism
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12114
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work BETA

What’s Wrong with “You Say You’Re Happy, but…” Reasoning?Jason Marsh - forthcoming - In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press.
On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where It Leads.Jason Marsh - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207.
Which Problem of Adaptation?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (4):474-492.
Children’s Rights and the Non-Identity Problem.Erik Magnusson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):580-605.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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