Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373 (2014)

Authors
Teresa Marques
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge can be given against MacFarlane’s revised views on assertion. The main objection to the relativist is that rational and earnest speakers are not bound by assessment-relative standards of correctness.
Keywords Relativism  Assertion  Commitments  Correctness conditions  John MacFarlane  Gareth Evans
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0100-3
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References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
Disagreements About Taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3335-3359.
Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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