Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

Erkenntnis 78 (4):881-898 (2013)
Authors
Carlo Martini
Tilburg University
Jan Sprenger
University of Turin
Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney
Abstract
This paper explores the scope and limits of rational consensus through mutual respect, with the primary focus on the best known formal model of consensus: the Lehrer–Wagner model. We consider various arguments against the rationality of the Lehrer–Wagner model as a model of consensus about factual matters. We conclude that models such as this face problems in achieving rational consensus on disagreements about unknown factual matters, but that they hold considerable promise as models of how to rationally resolve non-factual disagreements.
Keywords disagreement  consensus  mutual respect  Lehrer-Wagner model  rational consensus
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9381-8
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

All Agreed: Aumann Meets DeGroot.Jan-Willem Romeijn & Olivier Roy - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):41-60.
A Puzzle About Belief Updating.Carlo Martini - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.

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