Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception

Mind 128 (512):1205-1225 (2019)

Authors
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic of intentional action. This masking takes roughly the following form: when we are deceiving ourselves about what we are intentionally doing, we don't think about our action because it's painful to do so.
Keywords Practical Knowledge  Self-Deception  Anscombe  Self-Consciousness
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzy061
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References found in this work BETA

Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Who is Fooled?Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Must There Be Basic Action?Douglas Lavin - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):273-301.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
Seeing Through Self-Deception.Annette Barnes - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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