Russell's theory of meaning and descriptions (1905-1920)

Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (2):183-201 (1976)
Abstract
In several places bertrand russell purports to present an argument proving that definite descriptions have no meaning. There have been several interpretations about what this argument is and whether it is valid. I evaluate these interpretations and then present my own. I argue that russell's argument is defective for turning on an equivocation, Which is camouflaged by amphibolies
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2008.0614
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