Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data

Abstract
At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and that, accordingly, the argument from intuition fails
Keywords Analyticity  Deflation  Intuition  Metaphysics  Truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00074.x
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
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In Defense of a Dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
Concepts and Conceptual Analysis.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.
Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]James Justus - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):161-179.
The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Gillian Russell - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):712–729.

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