Dialogue 47 (1):81-102 (2008)
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ABSTRACT: Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible-metaphysically troubling and overly general-or trivial-collapsing into deflationism's "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causaI relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions.Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.RÉSUMÉ: Les théories correspondantistes de la vérité sont souvent critiquées soit de douteuses - discutables sur le plan métaphysique et trop générales - soit de triviales - n'offrant plus qu'une variante du déflationnisme, selon lequel «'P' est vrai si et seulement si P». Philip Kitcher a proposé une théorie correspondantiste «modeste», selon laquelle les rapports de référence sont des rapports causaux, sans pourtant l'accompagner d'une théorie générale de la dénotation. Je montre tout d'abord qu'ainsi comprises les théories «modestes» peuvent être critiquées pour leur trivialité. Expliquant ensuite en quoi consiste cette modestie, j'amorce l'articulation d'une théorie correspondantiste modeste, en donnant une description des rapports entre prédicats, propriétés et extensions. Je montre enfin que cette version de la théorie ne tombe pas dans le déflationnisme.
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Keywords | Contemporary Philosophy General Interest |
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ISBN(s) | 0012-2173 |
DOI | dialogue200847147 |
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